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baselines and maritime zones being assessed. Maritime boundary agreements and joint development 
zones are also highlighted. Finally, indications that maritime jurisdictional claims are being more 
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Introduction
The South China Sea is host to a complex coastal 
geography, numerous sovereignty disputes over 
islands featuring multiple claimants, excessive and 
controversial claims to baselines, confl icting and 
overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction and, most 
recently, contested submissions regarding extended 
continental shelf rights. The objective of this paper 
is to review and analyse these issues from spatial, 
legal and geopolitical perspectives. An overview and 
assessment of the geographical and geopolitical 
factors that inform and underlie the South China 
Sea disputes is offered prior to the claims of the 
littoral states to baselines and maritime zones being 
assessed. Maritime boundary agreements and joint 
development zones are also highlighted. Finally, 
indications that maritime jurisdictional claims are 
being more vigorously enforced are explored.
Geographical and geopolitical 
context
The South China Sea is a large semi-enclosed 
sea, encompassing at least three million square 
kilometres, bordered by – in clockwise order from 
the north – China and Taiwan; the Philippines; 
Malaysia; Brunei Darussalam (Brunei); Indonesia; 
Singapore; and Vietnam. Additionally, Cambodia 
and Thailand border the South China Sea’s Gulf of 
Thailand extension. A key consequence of the South 
China Sea’s semi-enclosed character, coupled with 
the large number of coastal states involved, is that 
their maritime claims tend to converge and overlap 
with one another. The broad dimensions of the 
South China Sea mean that there is in excess of 400 
nautical miles (nm) between opposing shores; a large 
high-seas pocket or ‘doughnut hole’ may exist in the 
central South China Sea (see below). The maritime 
jurisdictional scenario is, however, considerably 
complicated by the presence of multiple groups of 
insular features of diverse types in the South China 
Sea. The principle island groups of the South China 
Sea are as follows (clockwise from the northwest):
• The Paracel Islands, which comprise around 
130 islands, predominantly divided between 
the Crescent and Amphritite groups (disputed 
between China/Taiwan and Vietnam); 
• The Pratas Islands, the principle feature of 
which is Pratas Reef, which is a circular coral 
reef 11 miles across, enclosing a substantial 
lagoon (under the administration of Taiwan, 
claimed by China); 
• Scarborough Reef (or Shoal), a feature 
consisting of a large coral atoll, submerged at 
high tide save for several small outcrops, and 
associated lagoon (disputed between China/
Taiwan and the Philippines), and Macclesfi eld 
Bank, located to the west of Scarborough Reef, 
which is an entirely and permanently submerged 
feature; 
• The Spratly Islands, consisting of around 
150–180 generally small islands, islets, rocks, 
reefs as well as numerous low-tide elevations 
and submerged features (claimed in whole or 
in part by Brunei, China/Taiwan, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam); and, 
• The Natuna Islands which comprise an 
extensive group of over 200 islands and other 
insular features in the southwestern South 
China Sea.
As indicated above, with the exception of the 
Natuna Islands, which are under the uncontested 
sovereignty of Indonesia, sovereignty over all 
of these island groups is subject to dispute. 
Additionally, with respect to issues of maritime 
jurisdiction, the South China Sea islands are 
potentially highly signifi cant. In this context the 
legal status of these insular features, as well as 
their potential role in the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries, assumes critical signifi cance. For 
example, should the disputed South China 
Sea islands be classifi ed as islands capable of 
generating exclusive economic zones (EEZs) to 200 
nautical miles (as opposed to “rocks” which cannot), 
then the potential high seas pocket mentioned 
above disappears.
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Geopolitical drivers for the South 
China Sea disputes
The key geopolitical factors that inform, underlie 
and drive the South China Sea disputes include 
abiding concerns over sovereignty and sovereign 
rights, concerns over freedom of navigation and 
the security of critical sea lanes, and marine 
resource access considerations. Among these 
factors sovereignty looms large. Despite deepening 
globalisation, bounded Westphalian territorial 
states have by no means withered away, perhaps 
least of all in East and Southeast Asia. Disputed 
sovereignty, especially over land territory (disputed 
islands), therefore remains a root cause for the 
South China Sea islands disputes, especially when 
coupled with the negative infl uences of historical 
competition and animosity.
The South China Sea is host to a series of Sea 
Lines of Communication (SLOCs) of regional and 
global signifi cance. Secure SLOCs and freedom of 
navigation are essential to the smooth functioning of 
the global economy as international trade remains 
overwhelmingly reliant on maritime transport. 
Indeed, if anything, this dependence on sea-borne 
trade is accentuated for the generally resource-
poor but export-oriented economies of East and 
Southeast Asia, and in this context the SLOCs that 
traverse the South China Sea are unquestionably 
crucial. There is also a strong, and increasing, 
energy security dimension to sea lane security in 
the region. It is worth noting that the network of 
SLOCs connecting the constricting chokepoints that 
provide entry to and egress from the South China 
Sea tend to avoid the disputed South China Sea 
islands as hazards to navigation.
Concerning access to marine resources, there 
has been a long-standing – though arguably not 
well-founded – perception that the disputed areas 
of the South China Sea host substantial reserves 
of seabed energy resources. Such hydrocarbons, 
should they exist, would undoubtedly be highly 
attractive to the South China Sea littoral states, 
all of whom save for Brunei are facing increasingly 
urgent energy security concerns. However, 
estimates regarding the oil and gas potential 
of the South China Sea vary wildly; they are 
often speculative, poorly supported, and are 
thus frequently highly misleading and should be 
viewed with caution. Nonetheless, the persistent 
perception that the South China Sea represents a 
major potential source of seabed energy resources 
remains a key driver in the South China Sea 
disputes. Recent incidents involving oil and gas 
exploration activities in the South China Sea have 
served to reinforce this view.
Finally, the semi-enclosed, tropical environment of 
the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand hosts 
marine environments of great richness in biodiversity 
terms. These environments support fi sheries of 
signifi cance in global, and certainly regional, terms, 
especially with respect to the food security of coastal 
populations numbered in the hundreds of millions. 
It follows that access to the waters of the South 
China Sea for fi shing, as well as the preservation and 
protection of the marine environment that supports 
such activities, should be the top priority for the 
South China Sea coastal states. Unfortunately, 
however, the marine environment, biological 
diversity and living resources in question are widely 
acknowledged to be under serious threat. 
Claims to maritime jurisdiction
All of the South China Sea littoral states, with the 
sole exception of Cambodia, are parties to the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  
Consequently, it is appropriate to assess their 
claims to maritime jurisdiction against the backdrop 
of UNCLOS.
Baselines
Maritime claims are dependent on sovereignty over 
land territory possessing a coast in keeping with 
the legal maxim that ‘the land dominates the sea’. 
Baselines along coasts are, in turn, fundamental to 
claims to maritime jurisdiction, as maritime zones 
are measured from such baselines. UNCLOS1 
provides for multiple types of baselines. However, in 
the absence of any other claims, ‘normal’ baselines 
coincident with the low-water line as shown on 
large-scale charts recognised by the coastal state 
concerned will prevail in accordance with Article 
5 of UNCLOS. In the context of the South China 
1     United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, Publication no.E97.V10, (New York, NY: United Nations, 1983). 
See, 1833 UNTS 3, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
Montego Bay, Jamaica (entered into force 16 November 1994), 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_
overview_convention.htm>. 
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Sea, normal baselines as well as the convention’s 
provisions on the baselines of reefs (Article 6 of 
UNCLOS) are particularly relevant to the baselines and 
maritime claims of the generally disputed South China 
Sea islands. Normal baselines are also applicable to 
the maritime claims of Brunei as well as of those of 
China and Vietnam within the Gulf of Tonkin. 
With regard to the mainland coasts of the states 
surrounding the South China Sea, the majority of 
the states concerned evidently consider that their 
coasts are deeply indented or fringed with islands 
in their immediate vicinity and have accordingly 
defi ned systems of straight baselines as provided for 
under Article 7 of UNCLOS. Such claims to straight 
baselines have been made by Cambodia, China and 
Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. While Malaysia has 
yet to offi cially publicise the location of its straight 
baselines, it is evident from Malaysian maps that 
such claims have been made. These claimed straight 
baselines are predominantly extensive and often front 
generally smooth coastlines or serve to link small, 
widely separated islands remote from mainland 
coastlines. Consequently, these claims have 
attracted international protests, notably from the 
United States, which undertakes a systematic review 
of the maritime practice of other states as part of its 
Freedom of Navigation (FON) program. Additionally, 
two of the South China Sea littoral states, Indonesia 
and the Philippines, are archipelagic states and have 
defi ned archipelagic baselines in keeping with Article 
47 of UNCLOS.
Claims to maritime jurisdiction
In keeping with the relevant provisions of UNCLOS, 
the South China Sea coastal states have generally 
claimed 12nm territorial seas and EEZs to 200nm 
from baselines together with continental shelf rights. 
Most of these claims have tended to be ambit in 
character. That is, they simply specify the maximum 
allowable breadth of the maritime zone in question, in 
keeping with the terms of UNCLOS. However, some 
more specifi c unilateral claims have been advanced, 
notably within the Gulf of Thailand; in the South China 
Sea proper by Malaysia in 1979; by Brunei in 1988; 
and Indonesia in 2010. Perhaps unsurprisingly given 
the disputes concerning sovereignty over islands, 
these unilateral maritime claims overlap with one 
another to a substantial extent.
The South China Sea is also host to claims to 
maritime space apparently based on historic 
arguments. Within the Gulf of Thailand, Thailand 
has since 1959 claimed the northernmost extension 
of that body of water, the Bight of Bangkok, as a 
historic bay. Additionally, since 1982 Cambodia 
and Vietnam have claimed an oblong area of 
‘joint historic waters’ projecting from their coasts, 
but within their claimed straight baselines, in the 
Gulf of Thailand. The Philippines has also long 
claimed rights within its Treaty Limits, that is, the 
‘box’ formed by several late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century treaties. China’s controversial 
so-called ‘nine-dashed line’ or ‘U-shaped line’ claim 
may also constitute a historic claim to large portions 
of the South China Sea. It remains uncertain whether 
the dashed line represents a claim to sovereignty 
over the disputed islands within that territory – 
indicative of a unilateral claim to a maritime boundary 
– or represents a claim to the maritime spaces within 
the dashes, whether as historic waters or another 
type of maritime zone. 
Submissions relating to the outer limits of the 
continental shelf where it extends beyond 200nm 
from baselines made in 2009 by Vietnam alone 
and Malaysia and Vietnam jointly to the United 
Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS) have led to some clarifi cation in the 
maritime claims of at least some of the South China 
Sea states. The implication of these submissions 
is that, as far as Malaysia and Vietnam at least 
are concerned, the disputed islands of the South 
China Sea should not be awarded full 200nm EEZ 
and continental shelf rights. These submissions 
prompted China to issue protest notes which, 
importantly, included maps showing China’s 
nine-dashed line. These notes led to responses 
and counter-protests from other interested South 
China Sea states – notably Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam – that, in turn, led to further 
diplomatic correspondence. These diplomatic – and 
not so diplomatic – exchanges are revealing in that 
they serve at least to partially clarify the positions 
of these states. What is also clear, however, is 
that China not only regards the disputed South 
China Sea islands as being ‘indisputably’ subject 
to Chinese sovereignty, but also that these islands 
are capable of generating the full suite of claims to 
maritime jurisdiction. 
12 Increasingly contested waters? Confl icting maritime claims in the South China Sea
Maritime boundary and joint 
development agreements
Although the South China Sea tends to be portrayed 
as host to numerous contentious territorial and 
maritime disputes and as a potential arena for 
confl ict, several encouraging maritime agreements 
have been achieved, albeit generally and at the 
periphery of the South China Sea. Notable examples 
include boundary agreements between Brunei-
Darussalam and Malaysia (inherited from the United 
Kingdom and through a 2009 Exchange of Letters), 
Indonesia and Singapore (1973 and 2009), Thailand 
and Malaysia (1979), Thailand and Vietnam (1997), 
China and Vietnam (2000), and Indonesia and 
Vietnam (2003). 
Additionally, the South China Sea hosts multiple 
maritime joint development agreements and 
cooperative arrangements of a practical nature. 
These include those between Malaysia and 
Thailand (agreed in principle in 1979 and 
implemented from 1990) concerning seabed 
energy resources; between Malaysia and Vietnam, 
also related to seabed hydrocarbons exploration 
and development in 1992; and between China 
and Vietnam in 2000, concerning joint fi shing 
activities as part of their above-mentioned maritime 
boundary treaty. Cambodia and Thailand also 
agreed in principle to pursue an accord on maritime 
joint development for part of their overlapping 
claims area in 2001, although little progress has 
subsequently been achieved. Further, through their 
2009 Exchange of Letters Brunei and Malaysia 
reportedly reached an accommodation with respect 
to formerly disputed seabed areas now confi rmed 
as under Brunei’s jurisdiction, but according to 
Malaysia’s national oil company, Petronas, a leading 
role in their exploration. 
Increasingly contested waters?
In one sense little has changed in relation to 
the South China Sea disputes. The sovereignty 
disputes over islands that are at the root of the 
problem remain unresolved and there appears 
little prospect of their being addressed in the 
foreseeable future. Further, no new maritime 
claims have been advanced as such. For example, 
continental shelf rights are inherent to coastal 
states so the submissions relating to the outer 
limits to the continental shelf made to the CLCS 
do not constitute fresh claims in a legal sense. The 
counterpoint is that their articulation has proved 
to be highly contentious. Thus, these submissions 
and the diplomatic notes that they prompted 
have provided welcome, albeit partial clarifi cation 
regarding at least some of the previously ambiguous 
claims of the South China Sea coastal states. 
Simultaneously, however, the stark differences 
between the opposing positions of the claimant 
states have also been highlighted. 
What does appear to have changed in recent years 
is that there has been a signifi cant escalation in 
tensions in the South China Sea. In particular, in 
recent years a series of incidents have occurred 
involving Chinese maritime surveillance and 
enforcement agencies and Chinese-fl agged 
fi shing vessels in waters closer to the proximate 
mainland and main island coastlines than to the 
nearest disputed islands. Such actions appear 
to be based on the nine-dashed line, rather than 
maritime claims in line with the terms of UNCLOS 
advanced from the disputed islands. Incidents have 
included enforcement activities related to fi sheries 
jurisdiction, for example with respect to waters that 
Indonesia considers to form part of its EEZ, as well 
as interventions to disrupt oil and gas survey and 
exploration activities conducted by Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam in their respective coastal 
waters. Moreover, in June 2012 the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) issued tenders for 
oil concessions in close proximity to the Vietnamese 
coastline, yet just within the nine-dashed line.
These incidents appear in part to have arisen as 
certain South China Sea coastal states, notably 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam 
have sought to undertake activities in what they 
consider to be their waters, proximate to their 
mainland and main island coasts. These states 
appear to have taken the view that those parts of 
the South China Sea closer to their undisputed 
territories than to any disputed feature in the South 
China Sea are undisputed. It is increasingly apparent 
that China disagrees. Worryingly, China not only 
appears resistant to such efforts to restrict or 
minimise the area of the South China Sea subject 
to dispute, but is also apparently increasingly willing 
to back up its assertions with enforcement actions 
on those waterways, apparently up to the limits of 
the nine-dashed line which encompasses the vast 
majority of the South China Sea. It also remains 
open to question whether recent efforts on the part 
of the Philippines to initiate arbitral proceedings with 
China under Annex VII of UNCLOS on a number 
of uncertainties in the Chinese position, including 
the status of the nine-dashed line assertion and 
the status and role of certain South China Sea 
insular features, will bear fruit. Consequently, for the 
foreseeable future the South China Sea states are 
indeed faced with increasingly contested waters.   
